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Why Network Fingerprinting is Your Strongest First Defense

A critical new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server, identified as CVE-2025-53770, is being actively exploited and presents a serious risk to organisations. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to take complete control of a server over the network, so immediate and effective defence is a priority. Microsoft disclosed the flaw on 19 July.

Vendor patches are essential, but zero-day activity often starts before most organisations can patch. That gap is where proactive controls matter.

This post looks at the technical nature of this threat and how a strategy centred on network fingerprinting can block zero-day exploit activity before a formal patch is deployed.

Understanding the Threat: CVE-2025-53770

The SharePoint vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it allows for the deserialization of untrusted data, leading to remote code execution without any need for attacker authentication. This makes any unpatched, internet-facing on-premises SharePoint server a potential target. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has underlined the severity of this threat by adding it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.

Exploitation can lead to a complete compromise of the SharePoint server, allowing attackers to steal data, execute arbitrary code, and potentially move laterally across the internal network.

The Race Against Scanners

When a zero-day vulnerability like this is discovered, a global, automated race begins. Malicious actors immediately deploy scanners to canvass the internet for vulnerable systems.

Our own analysis shows that the majority of malicious requests targeting our clients came from the DigitalOcean and Scaleway ASNs, with Amazon Web Services (AWS) EC2 and Microsoft Azure also being a prominent source. These networks are well-known for being used by malicious actors to launch scanning and attack campaigns quickly. Notably, scans were happening on 16 and 17 July, before the vulnerability was disclosed by Microsoft.

This initial scanning phase, however, creates an opportunity for defence. Instead of waiting to analyse the specific attack payload, we can identify and block the very tools the attackers are using.

Sharepoint exploit attempts Exploits attempts in the wild. Note attempts days before disclosure.

Why IP Reputation Isn't Enough

For years, a primary method of defence has been IP reputation—blocking traffic from IP addresses known to be malicious. While simple and somewhat effective against basic attacks, this approach is increasingly unreliable in the face of modern threats.

The rise of sophisticated proxy services has changed the model. Attackers now have easy access to vast networks of residential, mobile, and rotating data centre proxies. These services allow them to distribute their attack traffic across thousands or even millions of seemingly legitimate IP addresses, making it impossible to maintain an effective blocklist. An IP that sends a malicious request one moment could be used by a legitimate customer the next.

Furthermore, attackers leveraging cloud infrastructure use ephemeral IPs that exist for only a short time, rendering IP-based blocking a constant and losing game of cat and mouse. This approach also carries a high risk of "collateral damage", where legitimate users are blocked simply because they share an IP address with a bad actor, a common scenario with Carrier-Grade NAT (CGNAT) or public Wi-Fi. Relying solely on where a request comes from is no longer a viable strategy.

Unmasking the Attacker's Tools with Network Fingerprinting

This is where network fingerprinting becomes useful as a zero-day defence. Fingerprinting in cybersecurity refers to methods used to identify the unique characteristics of devices, software, or users. It allows for the identification and categorisation of operating systems and software based on their distinct signatures in network communications.

When attackers rush to exploit a new vulnerability, they don't use standard web browsers. They quickly code scanners using programming languages and libraries like Python, Go, or Java. These tools and libraries create network connections with distinct, non-browser-like fingerprints. By analysing these, we can block the scanner before it ever delivers its malicious payload.

Peakhour uses several passive fingerprinting techniques to do this:

TCP Fingerprinting

This method identifies a device's operating system by analysing how it implements the TCP protocol. By examining nuances in TCP packets—like window size, Time to Live (TTL), and how the device responds to non-standard packets—we can identify the underlying system that created the request.

TLS Fingerprinting

This technique analyses the "ClientHello" message sent by the client during the initial TLS handshake to establish a secure connection. The combination of TLS version, supported cipher suites, and extensions creates a unique fingerprint. This is a highly effective way of identifying the classes of connecting clients, such as those made by Go, Python, or Java libraries, which are commonly used for attack tooling. JA4 and JA3 are popular TLS fingerprint formats.

HTTP/2 Fingerprinting

This involves analysing how clients use the HTTP/2 protocol, including their patterns in sending HTTP/2 frames and negotiating connections. This makes it easier to differentiate between legitimate browsers, bots, and the custom applications used in an attack campaign.

After identifying these fingerprints, Peakhour's bot management service uses machine learning to classify them as either a legitimate browser or a bot. This provides a strong layer of defence against zero-day exploits. The scanners are identified and blocked based on their fundamental network characteristics, irrespective of the specific vulnerability or payload they carry.

Defense in Depth

No single security measure is a silver bullet. While network fingerprinting provides a powerful first line of defence against automated scanners, a multi-layered, defence-in-depth strategy matters.

Any request that manages to bypass the initial fingerprinting checks must face the next layer: our standard Web Application Firewall (WAF) with post-body scanning. A WAF inspects every request before it reaches the application. By enabling the inspection of the full request body, the WAF can identify and block malicious payloads, such as the specific code used in an exploit attempt, that may be hidden within the data sent to the server. Our WAF was updated with a virtual patch on 22 July at 5am AEST to add protection against this vulnerability.

Staying Ahead in a Zero-Day World

The SharePoint CVE-2025-53770 vulnerability shows why a reactive security posture is not enough. While patching is essential, the reality is that attackers move first.

By using proactive techniques like network fingerprinting, organisations can identify and neutralise the automated tools attackers rely on during the critical opening hours of a zero-day exploit's life. This approach, when combined with payload inspection from a WAF, gives critical assets another layer of practical protection.